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ABSTRACT
Although the current literature on technology and development has mainly focused on the
Internet, I focus on a case where an "old" technology can be more beneficial and appropriate. In
1993, the Peruvian Government created the Telecommunications Investment Fund - FITEL, a
fund aimed at providing subsidies to the private sector so that they would provide
telecommunication services to remote and poor communities. FITEL's rural public telephone
projects have had tremendous impacts on isolated and poor rural communities, providing an
increase in welfare. The FITEL model has been replicated in many countries around the world as
it has been considered successful by the literature and the development organizations. However,
FITEL has also have drawn much criticism due to many problems that were unforeseen at the
design phase of the projects. In this thesis we analyze how the political environment, the
institutional arrangements, and the different actors affected the outcomes of the projects,
providing some lessons to policy makers, especially those working on developing projects
involving technology.
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1. Introduction
When reviewing the literature on developing programs and projects that involve
technology as a key element, I was struck by how much emphasis Internet and mobile phones
have received in the last decade. In the literature, Information and Communication Technology
(ICT) is synonymous to the Internet, personal computers (PCs), and mobile technologies,
generally mobile phones. Author's have generally dismissed radios, traditional telephones (home
lines and public phones), and televisions as low-level technologies from the past.
After the hype that occurred in the late 90s' over the possible benefits and solutions that
ICTs could bring to the developing world, the development community took a more sober and
cautious view. ICTs were no longer seen as a silver bullet against the perennials development
problems but rather as a means to achieving other development goals such as education, health
care, communication, and employment generation.
Most development organizations, governments, and NGO's have incorporated the view
that old technologies can and should be leapfrogged by "new" ICTs into their discourse. In a
recent talk given by Peru's Vice-president for Communications, the idea that poor and remote
communities need the Internet rather than public phones was also central:
"We are in the 2 1"s Century, we should give [poor and remote] communities 2 1"s Century
technology. Communities are no longer requesting telephones, they are requesting Internet,
which benefits are greater" '
'Opening speech given at the presentation of FITEL's Isolated Communities Internet Project (BALA) on July 2nd,
2008 at the Swiss Hotel in Lima
Implicit in the Vice-minister's statement is the fact that poor and remote communities in
Peru need "new" technology, such as Internet, vis-A-vis the "old" technology, such as public
phones. The idea she conveyed during the talk, although not expressed explicitly, was that rural
communities need Internet services more than phones. As we shall see in thesis, the assumption
that the newest and best technologies should be offered to the poor in developing countries as a
way to help them climb the development ladder should be challenged since in certain cases
providing an older technology could provide far greater benefits. I am not convinced that older
technologies, such as public phones, radios, or televisions, are outdated and provide fewer
benefits than newer technologies, such as the Internet or advanced mobile technologies, or that
these older technologies should be leapfrogged in favor of the newer ones. This is why I decided
to analyze rural public telephone projects in this thesis. Even though I acknowledge the need for
technologies like the Internet or mobile phones with advanced multimedia features, I find that
there is a gap in the current literature regarding the potential of traditional technologies and the
benefits that are occurring in many developing countries, and a bias towards taking the "latest"
and "most advanced" technologies to the poor in developing countries. I believe that this bias can
make decision makers overlook more appropriate technologies for many developing countries,
especially the rural poor.
The Peruvian Telecommunications Investment Fund (FITEL)
In 1993, the Peruvian government created a Telecommunications Investment Fund (FITEL)
to serve as a universal access provision fund. This fund was modeled after Chile's SUBTEL, but
included several modifications like the payment method to be employed and the financial source
of funding. While SUBTEL employed coin-slot payphones and financed it's projects with money
from the public treasury, virtually all of the Peruvian phones used pre-paid phone cards and
charged a 1% tax on the telecommunications firms' revenues in order to fund FITEL, which
would exclusively finance rural telecommunication projects. FITEL would provide this money as
a set of subsidies to the private sector, which had found that investments in most rural areas of
Peru were unprofitable. These subsidies would serve as incentives by making the private
company's projects profitable or at least make them not lose money.
When determining the communities that would be targeted, FITEL's first challenge was to
define the selection criteria that would help filter the thousands of isolated and poor communities
that would benefit from telephone services. FITEL's defined "rural communities" and "locations
of preferred social interest" as:
* Communities with up to 3,000 inhabitants
* Communities with less than 100 contiguous homes or more than 100 dispersed homes.
* All capitals of districts that complied with the previous two conditions, in spite of being
urban according to the INEI, were automatically considered as candidate communities for
FITEL projects
FITEL was in charge of designing, bidding, granting, and supervising the projects. Once
the private telecom company won the bid, it was in charge of acquiring, installing, operating, and
maintaining the equipment, as well as finding a local administrator who would serve as the local
concessionary for the public phone. This local administrator would provide a place in his home
or store where the phone would be placed and the satellite, solar panels, batteries, and other
equipment would be located in his back yard. In most cases the local administrator would also be
expected to stock pre-paid phone cards for the community to buy and train them in how to use
the public phone or the pre-paid phone cards. In retribution for his responsibilities, the local
administrator would receive a discount on the price of the pre-paid phone cards 2 (about 8%) and
be allowed to charge a moderate rate (about 35 cents of a US dollar) when they would locate a
person and inform them that they would be receiving a call at a certain hour or passing on a
message to them. Some ingenious local administrators found ways to capitalize on the phone
service that was provided in their homes by selling sodas or snacks or improving ways in which
they informed the local community members that they were being called. For example, some
local administrators bought and installed a megaphone and placed it on their home's roof in order
to announce the name of the person that was being called and not have to walk around looking
for him.
FITEL would supervise and monitor the private company's performance in order to
ensure that the contract's requirements would be met. Twice a year FITEL would evaluate the
public telephone service in a sample of rural communities and, if the private company met the
minimum requirements, it would disburse the subsidy.
Overall Problems
The FITEL projects were not free of problems. Along the years, FITEL has made many
mistakes such as designing their RPT projects with little or no consideration of rural realities, not
establishing in the contract the community's training as an obligation for the private company,
and most importantly underestimating the role of, to my opinion, the most important actor in the
RPT model: the local administrator. Despite its mistakes, FITEL has learned from them and has
incorporated into its recent projects elements that would eliminate or at least mitigate the
2 There were phone cards worth 3, 5, and 10 soles, which is about $1.2, $1.8, and $3.6 at current exchange rates
problems preset in the RPT projects. This is an interesting case of institutional learning that was
driven by the mistakes that caused FITEL much criticism from inside the government and a
lower level of phone use by the local community members.
We will analyze the most common problems and describe how these were introduced
during the projects' design and we will explain why the problems were unforeseen and not
eliminated. As we will see, most problems were due to a lack of understanding of rural
communities by FITEL employees and many of these problems could have not been resolved
without introducing other problems or elevating the costs of the projects to a point where they
would not be feasible.
The Benefits
The literature states that Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) can help
the poor by allowing them to access markets, gain information that will help them improve their
productive decisions, reduce transaction costs, access other public services such as health and
education, foster their social relations, gain political participation, access new jobs and income
generating opportunities, and, in general, increase their welfare (Rahman, 2007; World Bank,
2006; United Nations, 2006; Kane, 2003). Even though I was trained as a systems engineer as an
undergraduate and my main area of study was on ICTs, I was skeptical of the promises of ICTs
for stimulating economic development because of the level of underdevelopment that I had seen
in many parts of Peru. I thought that poor people needed water and sanitation services, or health
services, or education more than they needed ICTs. Since many of the poorest people in Peru and
the world could not read or did not have the means to obtain food, I was doubtful of the possible
benefits that ICTs could bring to them.
The White Tower Decision Maker: A Top-Down Approach
The government officials in charge of designing the FITEL projects were without a doubt
some of Peru's most qualified public professionals. Most of the initial employees of FITEL were
engineers who were experts in telecommunications technologies or economists that understood
the intricacies of the financial aspects of projects. This expertise allowed the organization to be
on par with the private sector companies and elaborate projects that would maximize the
governments' benefits and not fall prey to the private sector due to an unbalance of knowledge.
The organization where FITEL was based was also very technical, respected and serious.
In spite of the high levels of professionalism and expertise, and the superior
organizational environment, FITEL employees lacked an understanding of the local culture,
context, economics, and overall lifestyle. As we will see, even though the projects were very
technical and the professionals designing them highly qualified and skillful, the FITEL rural
public telephone projects lacked contextualization, which undermined their design and
subsequent implementation.
Fierce Competition
FITEL encountered many unexpected problems and obstacles. From bureaucratic barriers
and inefficiencies to personal "attacks" from envious public officials, FITEL had to jump many
hurdles in order to get its projects approved and implemented. While this is common in
government affairs in general and in developing countries' projects in particular, what was
striking to FITEL officials was how many different unexpected events prevented their projects
from advancing and becoming a reality. One of the most frustrating instances for FITEL officials
was definitely the opposition it received from inside the government. In 2004, The Ministry of
Transportation and Communications (MTC) created its own Office of Communication Projects
(OPC) with functions and objectives virtually identical to those of FITEL. The MTC created its
own implementing office because it realized that FITEL was receiving much attention in a sector
that was greatly the MTCs responsibility. Given FITEL's prestige among government agencies
and its highly technical work, the Vice minister of Communications attempted to do the same
type of projects in an effort to obtain recognition. The main difference was that FITEL had
accumulated a great amount of money through the 1% revenue tax it charged the private telecom
companies while the OPC had no available funds (it had to apply for money from the public
treasury as did all the other ministries and public entities). Additionally, FITEL's projects did not
have to comply with the National Public Investment System's (SNIP) requirements, which were a
part of the Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF) because its funds were not considered as
part of the public treasury, granting FITEL discretion over the money that had been accumulating
in the fund. Before the OPC was created, the MTC approved FITEL's projects without much
trouble, but after the creation of the OPC, the MTC would direct the FITEL projects in need of
approval to the OPC, who would make many observations and delay the approval. As a former
general manager of FITEL said to me in an interview, the OPC had explicit orders to not approve
any of FITEL's projects. Furthermore, the OPC would copy FITEL's projects and then seek
funding from the public treasury through the SNIP. This adverse institutional arrangement
impeded that many of FITEL's projects be approved in a timely manner, adversely affecting the
rural communities who needed the help.
Mixed Outcomes
The outcomes of the FITEL projects have varied greatly. There are communities that
present high levels of telephone traffic as well was communities that present no traffic in periods
of two to three months. Certain communities have strong and healthy relationships with their
local administrator while others practically do not use the public phone because of the animosity
between the two parties. In some communities the local administrator is very committed to
offering the best service possible and has improved the conditions of the public telephone with
his own money by installing a phone booth to provide privacy to customers, installed light bulbs,
and installed a megaphone in order to inform community members when they are being called.
This difference between how well the local administrator got along with the local community can
probably be explain by a myriad of factors including the local administrator's personality and
how he handled the newly acquired status and monopolistic power, the prior relationship between
both parties, the level of benefits derived from the service to both parties, and the local
administrator's response to the community's complaints. This thesis will examine the different
outcomes and try to provide explanations on how these outcomes occurred.
Chapter Descriptions
My intention in this thesis is to show how and why FITEL projects, specifically the rural
public telephone projects, were designed, implemented, and monitored in the way they were in
the rural communities. In the first chapter, I will provide a brief history of the
telecommunications industry in Peru, define universal access and universal service, and explain
how different countries around the world, specially in Latin America, have sought to achieve
these objectives. All this will set the stage for understanding and explaining the need and role of
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FITEL, which will be explained in the second chapter. In the third chapter, I will describe main
findings related to the RPT projects and the communities that received a public phone. I will talk
about how the RPT projects encountered many unforeseen obstacles from different fronts. I will
also provide some examples of variation in the RPT projects implementation and outcomes
across communities of Peru. Finally, in my last chapter, I summarize findings and conclude.
The Research Questions
When conducting the research and in writing this thesis, I was trying to answer two main
questions:
1. Why were the outcomes in certain communities better than in other communities?
2. What were the exogenous and endogenous factors that affected FITEL 's RPTprojects?
The Surprises and Puzzles
When I began researching FITEL a year and a half ago, I never expected to encounter so many
puzzles and surprises. For example, some of the questions I made myself were:
* Why did the projects forget to consider the local administrator?
* Why did a battle for power and recognition halt many of FITEL's projects and how did
this battle start and finish?
* How were certain rural communities chosen over thousands of possible communities?
* Why were pre-paid public telephones put in place despite the communities' desire for
coin slot public telephones?
* Why were the private companies not required to train the communities on how to use the
public phone and the pre-paid phone cards?
Questions like these puzzled me and motivated me to continue interviewing people and seeking
answers.
Methodology
I had a total of 36 interviews for this research in which two were actors from research
institutions and universities, seven from local communities, two from NGOs, five from central
and local governments, one local educator, six local entrepreneurs, eight FITEL officials, three
OSIPTEL officials, and two private consulting firm experts (See Table 1). Additionally, I visited
17 of the 6,056 rural communities (0.28% of all communities) that were part of FITEL's RPT
projects as well as 3 other communities that were not part of the FITEL projects but where local
entrepreneurs on their own had developed public phones and Internet caf6s. This local
development had occurred in placed that were more developed than the FITEL community,
especially in rural places that served as commercial hubs and were becoming more urban.
Finally, I thoroughly went through the documentation from all organizations involved in the
projects. The combination of official interviews, community visits, and documentation analysis
allowed me to understand not only FITEL as an organization, but also the context in which it
operated.
Table 1: People Interviewed
Patricia Diaz Former FITEL General Manager
Luis Alberto Bonifaz Former FITEL General Manager, Current Apoyo Consulting Manager
Jesus Guillen Former FITEL General Manager
Milton Von Hesse Former FITEL Rural Telephone Projects Coordinator
Jorge Bossio Former FITEL Analyst, Current Osiptel employee
Jorge Mesia FITEL Engineer
Aldo Laderas FITEL Engineer
Aldo Castro Rural Telecom General Manager
Peter Wolf Rural Telecom
Arieh Rohrstock Gilat to Home General Manager
Dante Villafuerte Independent Consultant, OSIPTEL/FITEL consultant
Jose Juan Haro Business Director for Telefonica
Erick Luna Telefonica Analyst
Christian Livia Sales Chief of Rural Telephony for Telefonica
Francisco Leiva Alterna Consultant, Former Subtel Engineer/Manager
Jesus Gonza Cuanto
Juan Fernando Bossio CEPES Consultant
Hector Salvador CEPES Director
Bias Lopez Rodriguez Macusani Municipality Employee
Luis Albino Director of Macusani School Unit
Christian Chee Gilat to Home Operations Manager
Efrain Yauri Former Telefonica Employee
Vidal Inojosa Lampa Local Administrator
Edwin Ricse Flores Lampa Community member
Vilma Torres Lampa Community member
Ruben Napa La Huaca Local Administrator
Moises Lopez
Espinoza Cuyo Agriculturer
Alberto Buitron Hauyan Local Administrator
Jorge Vifiac Local Administrator
Luis Camacho Rural Telephony Group EHAS
David Chavez Rural Telephony Group EHAS
Juan Carlos Cueva Telecommunications Engineer, Former Mobile Operator Manager
Alan Tapia Medina Former Satellite Installer and Maintenance Technician/Engineer
Carlos Centeno Rural Electrification Expert
Richard Webb Instituto del Peru Director
Table 2: Rural Communities Visited for Research
District Project Province
Lampa FITEL Huancayo
Pariahuanca FITEL Huancayo
Ayaviri Private Internet and Phone Booths Puno
Macusani FITEL Puno
Puno Rural Community 1 FITEL Puno
Puno Rural Community 2 Private Internet and Phone Booths Puno
Puno Rural Community 3 FITEL Puno
La Huaca FITEL Huaral
Hauyan FITEL Huaral
Cuyo FITEL Huaral
Palpa FITEL Huaral
Retes FITEL Huaral
Cagui o Esperanza? FITEL Huaral
Vifiac FITEL Yauyos
San Jeronimo FITEL Yauyos
La Florida FITEL Yauyos
Yauyos Rural Community 1 Telefonica Yauyos
San Jeronimo FITEL Lima
Asia FITEL Lima
Cafiete Rural Community 1 FITEL Lima
2. Background and Some Context
2.1.A Brief History of the Peruvian Telecommunications Industry
The first telephone service providers in Peru were small private companies. In 1920 a
private company, La Compahiia Peruana de Telffonos Limitada (CPT), began its operations
providing local and long distance telephone services in Lima, and was later bought by the
Peruvian government along with the other private companies. The nationalization process began
at the end of the 1960s when the Peruvian government defined a national telecom monopoly,
following what the theory on natural monopolies3 said and joining what most other nations
around the world were doing (Bilderbeck, Jaffe, and Sandvig, 1999). In 1969, the Empresa de
Telegrafos y Telecomunicaciones del Peri S.A. (ENTEL) began its operations offering domestic
and international long distance telephone service to all of Peru, as well as local phone service to
all of Peru except Lima, which was serviced by CPT. These two state-owned companies, CPT
and ENTEL, constituted a national monopoly with CPT providing local phone service to Peru's
capital, Lima, while ENTEL provided local phone service to the rest of the country as well as
providing national and international long distance call services to all of the country.
Inefficiencies in the Peruvian telecom industry were blatant in the 1990s. It could take up
to five years and cost around US$ 2500 to obtain a home phone line. The telephone fees
3 There are certain industries in the economy that are considered as natural monopolies, which
are situations where a single firm is desired because the production of the particular good or
service by a single firm minimizes cost (Viscusi, Harrington, and Vernon, 2005). Least-cost
production can be achieved through economies of scale, a phenomenon that is maximized by the
lack of competition and sharing of the market. Furthermore, the large amount of capital needed to
invest in the infrastructure requires that the single firm, which is the investor, have the needed
time to recuperate their investment without worrying about competitors taking away market
share.
The telecom industry has historically been considered a natural monopoly due to the large capital
investments needed, the declining average and marginal costs, and the economies of scale that
produce these decreasing costs.
incorporated large cross-subsidies from urban to rural consumers, which were distorted and did
not reflect the real costs (Bonifaz, and Bonifaz, 2004). The situation in which the telecom
industry was did not allow the state-owned companies to generate profit, which prevented two
things:
1. Expanding telephone coverage to millions of users, worsening the already acute social
differences found in the Peruvian society.
2. Improving current service to ensure that the client's needs were covered, especially in Lima.
At the beginning of the 1990s, Peru had the lowest number of phones - public, home
lines, mobile - per 100 people in South America: 2.6, compared to an average of 6.5 in the
region. Peru's low telephone penetration was due to the low levels of investment in telephone
network expansion during the 70s and 80s, which did not even reach US$ 50 million in the two
decades (Webb, 2007). The low investment in the Peruvian telecom sector by the Peruvian
government and its state-owned companies can be explained by three main factors:
1. Since 1983 and until 1990, the Peruvian government mandated that public companies stop
paying their foreign debt because they had no money to pay operational expenses, no longer
making them eligible for credit in the international finance market.
2. The decrease in fiscal income caused by the high government debt that was being payed off
plus the hyperinflation that Peru was experiencing severely limited the state's expenditure on
infrastructure.
3. The telephone fees, especially local ones, were below the operating costs because of the
country's inability to pay more for the fees, not providing the public companies with the
needed income to finance their expansion plans.
The problems in the telecom industry led the Peruvian government to begin a gradual
process of eliminating the monopoly by privatizing its state-owned telecom companies, thus,
substituting a public sector monopoly for a private sector monopoly. This process began in 1991
with a series of laws that sought to prioritize private investment in the telecom industry. With the
passing of the Telecommunications Law in 1993, which established that the Peruvian
government would stop offering telecom services and only regulate the industry, the ongoing
efforts to provide incentives for the private sector to invest were consolidated.
The process through which the Peruvian government gradually eliminated the state-
owned monopoly consisted in the following scheme:
1. The Peruvian government sold its public telephone companies (CPT and ENTEL) to a private
company and granted them a five-year exclusive concession over local and distances phone
calls.
2. This concession allowed the private company to prepare for competition that took place five
years later when the market was opened.
3. In 1994, this privatization process had a Spanish telephone company, Telefonica
Internacional de Espafia (Telefonica), as the winner of the international tender. This exclusive
concession would transform the public monopoly into a private monopoly.
4. In the first three years of this exclusive concessionary period, Telefonica changed the
telephone fees and gradually eliminated the cross-subsidy scheme, as was agreed upon in the
contract, in order to cover the service costs. The contract established a limit on the prices that
Telefonica could charge on local and long-distance calls. The Peruvian government
monitored the Spanish company during the concessionary period to ensure that it complied
with the contract's diverse goals and requirements such as increased expansion, infrastructure
modernization, and higher quality of services. Before the contract ended, Telefonica had been
successful in complying with the contract requirements.
5. In 1994, the Peruvian government established an agency that would regulate the telecom
industry. This state entity was the Organismo Supervisor de Inversi6n Privada en
Telecomunicaciones (OSIPTEL) and its role during the concessionary period was to ensure
that Telefonica's fees, quality of service, and obligations, which were established in the
contract, were respected. OSIPTEL performed very well and was very strict with Telefonica
ensuring that the Peruvian customers received a very good service.
6. In 1998, one year before its contract ended, Telefonica decided to terminate its concessionary
contract in order to have an advantage over other competitors that were not ready to
participate in an open market.
Since then, the telecommunications industry has enjoyed double digits of growth in
mobile telephones and Internet connections, especially in Lima, but more and more all over the
country. Currently, the Telecom sector receives the most amount of FDI: 31% of all FDI in Peru
(Prolnversi6n, 2008). As seen in the graph below, over the past years the communications sector
has constantly received a very significant part of FDI.
Chart 1: Amount of FDI in all Peruvian Industries vs. the Telecom Industry
Source: FITEL Rural Internet Project Presentation
2.2. Teledensity in Latin America and Peru
Teledensity is an index that measures the number of phones (home phones or landlines,
mobile phones, and public phones) per 100 inhabitants in a certain region. As can be seen in the
following table, Peru has the lowest teledensity in the region: 2.8 vs. 56.3 in 2005.
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Table 3: Teledensity in South America
Total # of Telephones per 100 habitants (including landlines, mobile, and
public)
1990
6.7
9.3
7.7
4.8
6.5
13.4
6.9
2.7
2.8
2.6
Teledensity
2005
89.8
80.1
60.2
60.1
59.8
49.4
40.1
35.8
33.4
28
Annual Growth Rate 1990-2005
18.9
15.4
14.7
18.4
15.9
9.1
12.4
18.9
18.1
17.1
Source: ITU
By 2005, Peru still held the last place in teledensity in South America as it did in 1990.
Furthermore, Peru's teledensity is currently half the South American average. In spite of this, its
annual growth rate between years 1990 and 2005 was one of the highest, which can be explained
in part by the really low initial conditions, the government's efforts to provide telephone service
to a vast number of Peruvians who lacked the service (the government achieved this expansion in
service through FITEL projects and by imposing a minimum number of rural phones that the
incumbent phone company - Telefonica - had to install before its concessionary contract
expired), and by the mobile operators' exponential growth and expansion throughout the country.
Chile
Argentina
Venezuela
Ecuador
Brasil
Uruguay
Colombia
Paraguay
Bolivia
Peru
...... i
2.3. Peruvian Demographics
According to the World Bank (World Bank, 2006), 14,609,000 (54,8%) of Peru's
population is poor and 6,513,000 (24,4%) is extremely poor. In rural areas, 72.5% of the
population is poor while 40.3% is extremely poor. In urban areas, 40.3% of the population is
poor while 7.9% is extremely poor.
Table 4: Poverty Statistics in Peru
Total Population
Poor
Urban
Rural
Extreme Poor
Urban
Rural
27,000,000
13,932,000
5,184,000
100%
52%
40.30%
72.50%
19.20%
7.90%
40.30%
Source: Peru World Bank Report 2006
Peru is a representative democratic republic that is distributed geopolitically as follows:
* Peru is divided in 25 regions
* Each region has a certain number of provinces, totaling 195 provinces.
* Each province is divided into districts, totaling 1833 districts.
The Human Development Index (HDI) for these 1833 districts are summarized in the following
table:
Table 5: 2005 Human Development Index in Peru and Districts
M-AA 51Z,b-b U.BU9 11.lbt 99.724 100 98.647 1,270.909
MIN 88 0.401 51.410 50.067 0 52.706 87.112
MEDIAN 4,338.5 0.552 67.788 86.569 86.100 85.209 235.822
Source: United Nations Development Program Peru (PNUD)
2.4. Universal Access and Universal Service
Universal access refers to the capacity of all people to access a certain service or product
that will benefit them. Most governments promote universal access in sectors such as health care,
electrification, telecommunications, and education. In the telecommunications sector there is a
distinction between universal access and universal service, although there is really no consensus
on the definition of each term. The former refers usually to traditional telecommunications
services such as public and home telephones; the latter refers to more advanced
telecommunication technologies such as Internet access and advanced mobile telephone services.
Developing countries have commonly sought universal access due to their very low
teledensity rates, while developed nations have sought for greater universal service, where
usually most of the population already has been reached by traditional voice technologies. At the
present time this distinction and choice between universal access and universal service, and the
prioritizing of universal access in developing countries vs. universal service in developed
countries, is being left behind as services are becoming more and more integrated - 3G
technologies on mobile phones, Voice over IP (VoIP) on internet-enabled networks - and
countries, such as Peru and many in Latin America, are embarking on universal service
programs.
There have been several ways through which universal access has been sought in different
countries around the world, and especially in Latin America. According to Stern and Townsend
(Stern and Townsend, 2006), there are 4 approaches that have been taken, or combined, by
countries in their efforts to reach universal access:
1. Market liberalization combined with regulatory initiatives including universal access
obligations and special regulations and conditions that favor projects and operations in
areas where the private sector would not invest without government intervention due to an
insufficient economic incentive.
2. Universal access funds, which were created to finance projects for the expansion of
telecommunication services.
3. Locally crafted financing methods and project initiatives. Led by national, state, and local
governments, along with cooperatives, NGOs, and other organizations.
4. State-mandated and controlled approaches using cross subsidies and other financing
mechanisms.
Chart 2: Growth of main line and mobile penetration rates in North America (Canada +
USA) and in Latin America between 1990 and 2005
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:ure 1: The GAPS Model
Source: Regulatel
The GAPS Model presented by REGULATEL (the Latin American Consortium of
Regulating Agencies) shows how universal access and service efforts should be targeted to those
areas that would never be served by the private sector. As seen in Figure 2, the Market Gap
represents all the communities that are currently not served by the market but could be served
without subsidies or other government incentives while profiting. The reason why these areas are
not being served is usually due to the company's lack of will or because the company is focusing
on a different objective group and its resources have already been assigned. In contrast, the
Access Gap represents the communities that would never be served by the private sector given
current conditions. These areas are uneconomical due to the communities' low demand, low
density, isolation, remoteness, low income, and other factors.
In the case of Peru, there is controversy over whether or not FITEL has served the
universal access/service gap or rather the market gap. FITEL has definitely not reached the
poorest of the poor, which is not necessarily wrong if it was not first intended to reach that group.
In general, the communities served by FITEL were chosen by the likelihood that the rural
telephones would be used in those locations and that the venture would become sustainable after
the subsidy terminated. In other words, FITEL chose the "best" and "most likely to succeed"
communities to be included in the RPT projects. While much has been achieved through the RPT
projects, FITEL has failed to reach those Peruvians in most need but rather has reached the
richest of the poor. In fact, this "creaming" issue was raised in an interview with a Telefonica
employee who affirmed that many of the FITEL communities were places that were profitable
and did not require a subsidy for the private sector. In other words, and if this were to be true,
there would be an inadequate distribution and targeting of the fund's resources and the private
sector involved in the projects would be receiving money that they really did not need in order to
make the venture profitable. The FITEL subsidies in many cases are working more as incentives
to provide service to specific areas that the private sector is uninterested in than as financial aides
to make the venture profitable.
The private companies challenged this accusation by providing some rough figures
regarding the profitability of their FITEL phones. The General Manager of Gilat to Home (Gilat),
the largest provider of FITEL phones with around 5,100 FITEL rural telephones, said that 10% of
the phones were performing very well and making a profit. These phones were generating 70% of
the network's traffic. About 50% of the telephones were making a slight profit; about 25% of the
phones were slightly losing money or breaking even; and 15% of the FITEL rural telephones
were performing poorly since they were losing money due to the low traffic. About 67% of these
unprofitable phones presented no traffic in periods of 2 to 3 months. The General Manager of
Rural Telecom, which has about 930 FITEL phones, said that about 30% of his network is
profitable, 30% is breaking even, and 40% of its network is not making a profit.
Peru's approach has basically covered all four different approaches at some point in its
history. OSIPTEL, when signing the concessionary contract with Telefonica, required that
Spanish company install at least one public telephone in 1,504 rural communities with over 500
inhabitants.
In Peru, universal access in the telecom sector has been sought through the creation of a
Telecommunications Investment Fund (FITEL), given the low teledensity figures and the large
number of the population that is isolated from the main cities. FITEL was created to increase
universal access and reduce tremendous technology gap present in, but not limited to, rural areas.
Alternative models to the telecom investment funds are Municipal owned telecom
infrastructure, which are managed as a private business. Examples of cities using these models
are:
* Lusk, Wyoming
* Longmont, Colorado
* Anaheim, California
* North Attleboro, Massachusetts
* Cedar Falls, Iowa
* Taunton, Massachusetts
Another alternative to telecom funds and municipal owned telecom infrastructure are
telephone cooperatives. These have been prevalent in the US and in neighbor countries to Peru
like Argentina and Bolivia (Navas-Savater, 2000).
In the next section we will analyze how universal access funds work in the
telecommunications industry and in what ways governments have set them up as to maximize the
benefits.
2.5. Universal Access Funds
Universal access funds have become popular sources of funding in many developing
countries as an alternative to cross-subsidies for reaching more people with telecommunication
services. The two most common mechanisms through which these funds have obtained their
financial resources are: 1) receiving a certain amount from the public treasury and 2) receiving a
certain percentage revenues from telecom private companies. The following chart shows the
different universal access mechanisms found in Latin America:
Table 6: Collected and Disbursed Amounts in Telecom Investment Funds in Latin America
Bolivia FNDR
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Disbursed
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Disbursed
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Disbursed
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As can be seen from the previous table, most of the Telecom Universal Access Funds in
Latin America have failed to use the collected money or have used a small part of their funds,
which are accumulating money that could be used for other pressing needs. In fact, this pattern of
no or little use is what most opponents to Universal Access Fund criticize. These critics sustain
that much money is being accumulated but not being spent and that alternative mechanisms
0%
$1,772,129,956
$0
$29,981,000
$29,981,000
$448,599,640
$165,995,817
$997,977
$0
$32,701,810
$0
$17,943,154
$7,756,518
$25,300,064
$25,300,064
$3,278,559
$0
$12,966,954
$12,485,360
$143,063,602
$45,076,256
$65,654,341
$10,774,157
$113,220,392
$0
0%
100%
37%
0%
0%
43%
100%
0%
96%
32%
16%
0%
Disbursed $0
would increase the population's welfare. They sustain that the opportunity cost to having the
money in a bank is too high and that the system should be changed.
2.6.Rural Telecommunications in Peru: Telefonica's Experience
In its concessionary contract with Telefonica in 1993, the Peruvian government included
an obligation to serve 1,500 rural communities. When elaborating the Rural Public Telephone
projects, FITEL officials benefited from Telefonica's experience. Many of the obstacles and
problems, along with the opportunities and knowledge, were taken into account when designing
the RPT projects. In this section we will describe Telefonica's experience of providing public
telephone service to rural communities. The importance of this effort is paramount given that the
communities targeted by FITEL were of the same characteristics of those served by Telefonica.
In a recent interview with an employee of Telefonica that works for the Rural Telephone
department, he provided the current information regarding the 1,500 telephones that were put in
place:
* 500 of these phones were profitable
* 500 of these phones were breaking even
* 500 of these phones were making the company lose money
Also, what they noted was that one of the main problems for expanding telephone services to
rural communities was a lack of telecom regulation for rural areas.
Telefonica's biggest problem was that the rural communities where it was obliged to
provide service were isolated and dispersed. Most of these communities were not easily
accessible; many of them did not have electricity or other basic services such as water and
sanitation. This low density meant high unit costs and did not allow for economies of scale.
Additionally, Telefonica faced problems regarding the technology that it would use. Up to that
moment, the technology that was used in Peru to reach remote rural communities and some urban
cities was a Multi Access Rural Radio Telephone System (MARRTS) so Telefonica decided to
use this technology to provide service to the 1,500 communities it had committed to serve. The
problem with this technology was that it was very vulnerable to theft due to the fact that its
antennas and equipment needed to be located in a remote and uninhabited area in order to reach
as many communities as possible. Telefonica's maintenance and operation costs were a
significant part of the total costs, and burglary was common. The frequent theft of equipment not
only increased the company's costs in terms of the price to replace stolen equipment or damaged
parts and the cost of man power, but also because of the fines that the Spanish company incur if it
did not provide a uninterrupted service. This problem led Telefonica to change its technology to
VSAT in 2004.
3. The Peruvian Telecommunications Investment Fund - FITEL
In this chapter, I will describe the different aspects of the Telecommunications Investment
Fund (FITEL). As can be seen in Chart 4, during the RPT projects FITEL was managed by
OSIPTEL, the telecommunications industry regulator, who approved the FITEL projects before
presenting them to the MTC.
Chart 3: The FITEL Model during the RPT projects - A Graphical Representation
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3.1.How FITEL was formed
In 1992, the Peruvian government privatized all state-owned telecommunications
companies and created a Telecommunications Regulatory Agency (OSIPTEL) (Prior to 1992 all
the telecommunications sector was state-owned and no private participation was present). In May
of 1993, OSIPTEL created the Telecommunications Investment Fund (FITEL), which began to
collect a 1% tax on gross operating revenues of telecommunications companies in order to fund
the expansion of the rural telephone service. In November of 2006, FITEL was modified and
became an individual public entity associated to the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications.
So far, FITEL has implemented several projects, which have mainly provided public
telephone services in rural communities but also have included providing Internet connections in
some communities. Currently FITEL is focusing more and more on providing Internet access to
rural communities.
The focus of this thesis is on FITEL's first four projects, which have reached a total of
almost six million people in about six thousand neglected and isolated rural communities. For
purpose of simplification, we will group these projects together and call them FITEL's Rural
Public Telephones (RPT) projects. In all of these projects, rural public telephones were the main
technology, although some of them included a small number of computers with an Internet
connection.
The average distance that the benefited community members have to travel in order to
reach a public telephone has been reduced from 48.71 km to 6 km after FITEL's projects were
implemented. Also, many of the main districts now have public Internet centers.
Chart 4: Average Distance to Phone Before and After FITEL
Source: FITEL
Given the size of the Peruvian population, the prior rates of telecom expansion, and the
difference between current and prior average walking distances to public phones, the RPT
projects can be considered very successful. On the other hand, the projects could be considered
unsuccessful if measured by the nature of problems that were triggered by the projects, the lack
of participation from the benefited communities, and a lack of analysis of cultural and contextual
aspects of the communities.
Moreover, there has been much variance when it comes to the project's outcomes. Given
the vast reach of the FITEL projects, it is hard to aggregate all projects and judge them as
successful or unsuccessful. Not only is this approach not reliable or appropriate, it is not helpful
when evaluating these rural projects and rescuing lessons learned to apply in future projects,
which is why our intention is not to render the FITEL projects in dichotomous categories but to
provide an analysis of the process through which these projects were designed and an explanation
of the outcomes.
3.2. FITEL 's Vision, Mission, and Objectives
FITEL clearly defined its vision, mission, and objectives. It is important to mention these
because as we will later see, one way to judge FITEL's projects is by contrasting the outcomes
vs. what the organization itself claims it should be doing.
FITEL's vision was to be the leading organization in Peru that integrated rural
communities and preferred social interest with the rest of the country, contributing to the
reduction of the digital gap through a continuous improvement of the telecom services and the
active participation of the public and private sector.
FITEL's mission was to promote the access to and the use of essential telecom public
services in rural and preferred social interest communities, formulating and evaluating telecom
investment projects and supervising their proper implementation while contributing to the
reduction of the digital gap.
FITEL's objectives were to:
* Reduce the universal access gap of telecom services in rural and preferred social interest
communities
* Promote social and economic development in rural and preferred social interest
communities, ensuring that the population have access to telecom services and are trained
in how to use ICT services.
* Stimulate the private sector's participation in the provision of telecom services to rural
and preferred social interest communities.
It is interesting to note that the first and third objectives were sought actively but the
second objective was not really something that was carried out by FITEL. For FITEL, promoting
social and economic development meant installing a public phone and assuming that the
community would find productive ways to use the phone and to increase their welfare. As will be
seen in chapter 4, a problem with the RPT projects of FITEL was that there were no requirements
in the contract for training the population in how to use the phone. The private company trained
the local administrator in how to use the phone and he was left as the person in charge of
showing others how to use the phone.
3.3. FITEL 's Legal and Regulatory Framework
The Peruvian Telecommunications Law created FITEL on May 6, 1993. This law
establishing the rules by which FITEL was to operate. According to this law, FITEL would
obtain its resources by:
1. A 1% tax on telecom companies' revenues
2. No less than 20% of the tax imposed on the radio electric spectrum
3. The resources transferred from the Public Treasury
4. The financial income generated by FITEL's resources
5. The transfers, donations, or assignations of any nature originating from any source
6. Any other source established by law in the future
From 1993 to 2006, FITEL was a part of OSIPTEL, the Peruvian telecom regulator. The
fund had its own manager who reported to the President of OSIPTEL. Being a part of OSIPTEL
allowed FITEL to support its operations with other departments of OSIPTEL. For example,
OSIPTEL's Monitoring and Control department was in charge of the monitoring and supervision
of the RPT projects, and even to this date this area still supervises and monitors FITEL's new
projects.
On November 4, 2006, a law was passed determining that FITEL would be an
autonomous agency assigned to the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MTC). The
law also established that a board of directors presided by the Minister of Transportation and
Communications and conformed by the Minister of Economics and Finance and the President of
OSIPTEL would manage FITEL.
This change was a consequence of a strong battle that carried on for years, a battle
between OSIPTEL and the MTC regarding the management and use of FITEL's funds. As we
will see in chapter 4, this battle negatively affected the design and implementation of projects,
delaying the help that thousands of rural Peruvian citizens desperately needed.
At one point, another law was passed that imposed additional bureaucratic obstacles
requiring that the National Public Investment System (SNIP), which had a rigorous methodology
for evaluating projects, approve FITEL's projects.
From the interviews conducted, every single actor pointed out that one of the main
problems with the FITEL projects and in providing telephone services to rural communities in
general was a lack of rural regulation. As we will see in chapter 4, the available regulation was
not contextualized to take into account the particularities of rural communities.
3.4. FITEL 's Subsidy Mechanism - Output Based Aid (OBA)
The FITEL projects that I have focused on were formulated using an Output Based Aid
(OBA) payment mechanism. OBA is a performance-oriented subsidy. The disbursement of the
subsidy is tied to the completion of certain contractual requirements. In the case of FITEL, the
following performance levels and goals, which were considered the outputs, were required in
order for FITEL to disburse the subsidy:
* 35% of the subsidy would be disbursed as an up-front payment after signing the contract
with the tender that won. This payment would help buy the equipment needed for the
installation.
* 25% of the subsidy would be disbursed after the installation of the equipment in the
communities was complete.
* The remaining 40% would be disbursed in equal parts every 6 months for 5 years upon a
satisfactory evaluation of the company's operation.
FITEL employed this subsidy structure after evaluating the experience in Chile where
SUBTEL (Chile's FITEL) disbursed the entire subsidy after the construction of the telephone
network and encountered delays in the operation of the phone network. FITEL observed that the
performance-oriented subsidies would work as an incentive to the private companies. After the
subsidy ended, FITEL became more strict and rigorous in its evaluations since it feared that the
private company would decrease is quality of service due to the extinction of the subsidy. The
private sector has complained that FITEL, through its evaluation and monitoring department, has
become too rigid and it is putting in danger the sustainability of current projects as well as
providing disincentives to the private sector to get involved in future FITEL projects.
The monitoring and evaluation of the projects was done as follows:
* Every six months FITEL would select a sample of targeted communities and evaluate
whether or not the private company was fulfilling its contract responsibilities.
* If the company had failed to comply to what was agreed to in the contract, FITEL would
penalize the company and not disburse the whole amount.
* If the company fulfilled all its responsibilities, FITEL would disburse the whole amount
of the subsidy.
The private companies mentioned in the interviews that the subsidies were not always
delivered on time and that several times there was a delay in the evaluations, causing the
subsidy payment to be held up.
3.5. FITEL 's Bidding Process
FITEL designed the RPT projects and after obtaining the approval from OSIPTEL and
from the MTC, it would proceed to call an international bid that had the following characteristics:
* The biding bases were elaborated
* The bid was called by promoting it in all major news papers and on FITEL's website
* The biding bases were sold to those who were interested
* The proposal envelopes were received from those wanting to participate in the bid
* On a determined date, there was a public opening of the first two envelopes: the legal one
and the technical one
* On the basis of the first two envelopes there would be a qualification to determine what
bidders would continue due to compliance with the bidding bases
* After determining what bidders had qualified, the third envelope was opened: the
economic one
* The bidder who requested the least amount of subsidy would be declared winner
* FITEL would sign a Financing Contract with the winner, who would receive a 20 year
concession in which they were obligated to provide the telephone service
FITEL decided to be technologically neutral in each of its RPT project's bids. In other
words, FITEL did not define what technology should be used by the private company but rather
specified the type of service that was required, certain minimum quality standards, an
approximate and referential subsidy, and the deadlines for the different phases of the projects
implementation. This technological neutrality allowed the private companies to not be
constrained to certain technologies granting them the possibility of choosing any technology that
would provide the service required by FITEL. Even though the technological neutrality in the
FITEL projects had its benefits, it also brought some problems that we will discuss in chapter 4.
3.6. FITEL 's Rural Public Telephone (RPT) Projects
Since 1998, FITEL has implemented 4 rural public telephone (RPT) projects. These four
projects allocated a total of US$ 52,075,333.069 benefiting 5,846,166 people in 6,056 rural
communities. In all of these projects, the rural public phone was the main technology used,
although two of these projects incorporated one computer with a very slow Internet connection in
the district capitals. As we will later see, these computers were marginal to the project and were
included for political reasons, cause for which we do not focus on these computers.
In the first three projects, none of the rural communities had access to any type of
telephone service before FITEL's intervention so the public telephones were the communities'
first opportunity to communicate with the rest of the country without having to physically travel
or sending a regular mail.
For the FITEL projects to be approved, FITEL had to first design the projects and get an
approval from OSIPTEL, who was in charge of FITEL. After approval, FITEL would send the
project to the Office of Public Investment (OIP) of the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications (MTC). The OIP would normally comment and request changes if it found any
objections to the project. After receiving approval from the MTC, FITEL would proceed to call
for an international bid. As we will see in chapter 4, having FITEL need the approval of the MTC
through the OIP delayed many of the projects and created additional obstacles.
The objectives and benefits of the RPT projects were clearly defined by FITEL before the
projects were implemented. The specific objectives of FITEL's RPT projects were:
* To ensure an adequate, in terms of quality and price, and continuous provision of public
telephone service to the chosen rural communities
* To maximize the profit of the invested money for each monetary unit
* To provide transparency when designating the projects and subsidies
* To promote private investment in rural areas
The benefits that were sought by these RPT projects were:
* Reduce the number of isolated rural communities
* Promote commerce of the rural communities' products with other communities
* Diversify the communities' production structure
* Decrease the communication costs
* Decrease the costs of providing public services such as health and education
* Improve the functioning of markets
* Contribute to a greater social cohesion and national security
The first RPT project was called North Border Project or FITEL I, and it was a pilot
project that served as a test for the RPT model developed by FITEL. In this project, 213
communities were provided with a public phone. The reasons why this project was implemented
in the northern border with Ecuador was because Peru and Ecuador had been at war 3 years
earlier and the government wanted to strengthen the border population's national identity as well
as make sure it had communication technologies in the area.
Figure 2: FITEL I
Source: FITEL
As can be seen in Figure 1, the dark green area of the map the map of Peru on the left is
the area that was targeted by FITEL I. On the figure to the right of the map of Peru is a zoom in
of the FITEL I area with 213 red points in the locations where the public phones were placed.
The area in dark purple right above the zoomed figure is the country of Ecuador.
The second and third RPT projects (FITEL II and III) were a massive attempt to provide
5,000 rural communities with telephone service, reaching the universal access objective
established in Peru's market opening lineaments, a guideline document drafted in preparation of
the transition from a monopoly to an open market.
The fourth RPT project (FITEL IV) increased the number of public telephones in rural
and preferred interest communities where the number of public phones was insufficient to cover
the demand. When elaborating the list of communities for FITEL II and III, local authorities
requested that FITEL finance and install additional public telephones for communities where the
existing service was insufficient due to large populations.
As can be seen in Figure 3, FITEL II, III, and IV covered every region in Peru reaching
nearly 6,000 rural communities.
Figure 3: FITEL II, III, & IV
Source: FITEL
Table 7: FITEL Rural Public Telephone Projects
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3. 7.Local Administrator Selection Criteria
A central part of the RPT model was the local administrator who was chosen by the
private company. FITEL did not incorporate any requirements into the contract with the private
company although it did recommend that the local administrator be someone in the community
with a location that was near the center of the community and that his place be open most of the
day.
Lipsky defines a street-level bureaucrat as someone who interacts directly with the
citizens in the course of their jobs and who has significant discretion in the execution of their
work (Lipsky, 1980). Although not exactly what Lipsky defines as street-level bureaucrats, due
to their non-affiliation to a public institution, one can find similarities between Lipsky's
description of street-level bureaucrats and two different agents in the RPT projects, which we
could call "community-level bureaucrats."
The first community-level bureaucrat is the private company's employee who was in
charge of visiting the rural community and choosing the local administrator. The private
companies had the following list of characteristics that had to be taken into account when
choosing who would be in charge of operating the public phone:
* The local administrator should have an enclosed back yard or area to place the where the
equipment (satellite, solar panels, batteries, etc.).
* The local administrator should preferably live close to the center of the community
* The local administrator should preferably have business experience
* The local administrator should preferably own a store or have a business at home that is
open all day
* The local administrator should be known and respected by the communities
Out of these characteristics, the only required one was that the local administrators have
an enclosed back yard or area in order to increase the safety of the equipment. The private
companies mandated this condition because of the high levels of burglary experience by
Telefonica in its rural telephone operations. The Spanish company lost millions of dollars each
year replacing the stolen equipment and paying the fines that accrued due to the loss of service.
Having previous business experience presumably increased the chances of having the
local administrator manage the phone as a business, therefore, more efficiently, and seeking for
someone who had a store or a business that was open all day would increase the public phone's
availability.
Although the private company employee had to choose someone in the community with
an enclosed area, he basically could choose any person that he deemed most appropriate for the
job considering the other characteristics. The high degree of discretion and relative autonomy
that are common to street-level bureaucrats was experienced by the private company employee in
charge of selecting the local administrator due to the remoteness of the locations where the
employee was sent.
The second community-level bureaucrat is the local administrator that was chosen by the
private company employee. The local administrator, as we will see in section 3.9 and in chapter
4, was a critical factor in the RPT projects. The discretion enjoyed by the local administrator
allowed him to run the business as he pleased. As we will see in chapter 4, the discretion enjoyed
by the local administrator, along with the monopolistic situation of the local administrator,
resulted in different outcomes. Although the private company did supervise the local
administrator sporadically and in some cases changed who the local administrator was in the
community, the local administrator had much freedom to manage the public phone service
without the private company controlling or regulating the situation.
3.8.Rural Communities Selection Criteria
When determining the communities that would be targeted, FITEL's first challenge was to
define the selection criteria that would help filter the thousands of isolated and poor communities
that would benefit from telephone services. FITEL's defined "rural communities" and "locations
of preferred social interest" as:
* Communities with up to 3,000 inhabitants
* Communities with less than 100 contiguous homes or more than 100 dispersed homes.
* All capitals of districts that complied with the previous two conditions, in spite of being
urban according to the INEI, were automatically considered as candidate communities for
FITEL projects
The FITEL communities placed much value on having a public phone in their location so
they made their requests to FITEL and OSIPTEL by letters, phone calls, and office visits. The
number of requests up to year 2001 is as follows:
Table 8: Telephone Service Requests to OSIPTEL by Department in Peru 1994 - 2001
Amazonas 1235 419
source: ri lL
As can be seen in Table 8, as we get closer to year 2001, we can see a reduction in phone
requests. This reduction is due to the FITEL projects that were implemented. In spite of great
advances made in the public telephone expansion, government officials in FITEL, OSIPTEL, and
the MTC say they receive hundreds of requests requesting telephone services in their
communities each year.
Ancash 11 5 7 13 17 29 127 27 236
Apurimac 1 1 9 2 9 17 62 26 127
Arequipa 1 0 0 0 6 3 26 4 40
Ayacucho 1 7 2 0 1 93 138 19 261
Cajamarca 6 16 10 8 16 159 234 56 505
Cusco 0 0 4 1 12 70 93 21 201
Huancavelica 1 0 18 8 4 44 111 16 202
Huanuco 2 0 4 37 5 18 49 22 137
Ica 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 0 11
Junin 1 2 6 6 0 38 65 24 142
La Libertad 2 0 1 0 4 49 136 22 214
Lambayegue 0 0 0 0 0 2 41 0 43
Lima 1 0 9 3 13 84 134 16 260
Loreto 0 0 0 0 1 10 6 1 18
Madre de
Dios 0 0 0 1 0 5 3 0 9
Moguegua 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 10
Pasco 2 1 0 1 2 7 18 10 41
Piura 0 0 6 7 1 33 27 12 86
Puno 0 1 1 2 9 15 132 11 171
San Martin 0 3 0 4 7 22 77 6 119
Tacna 0 0 0 9 0 6 5 1 21
Tumbes 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 4
I I I I I I
After FITEL had defined what it considered to be a rural community, it continued with
the selection of rural communities. The rural communities that were considered by FITEL were
defined by a baseline survey conducted on rural communities. Out of this survey a certain type of
rural community was chosen in order to choose the universe of potential rural communities and
the demand for telephone service was forecasted. Next, a methodology was developed to
optimize the selection of communities maximizing the economic benefits of each phone
installation. This methodology had two phases: (1) selection of a list of rural communities by
FITEL employees based on their data and information; and (2) conduction of workshops with
local authorities to verify the communities selected by FITEL and to assign priorities.
The selection and grouping process of rural communities was as follows:
* An initial list (universe list) or rural communities was elaborated
* An area of study was selected
* A list of possible rural communities that could be served by FITEL was elaborated
* A list formulated by FITEL employees of selected and grouped rural communities that
fulfilled one or more of the following characteristics:
o Community with one of the largest populations in the province
o Community with a high school
o Community with a health center
o Be situated at the intersection of access ways (rural roads, river crosses, horse
paths, etc.)
o All districts of capital were chosen
* Field visits were made to the selected rural communities in order to assess whether the
installation of public phones was technically viable.
* Workshops with local authorities (district mayors) as well as with representatives of the
civil society were held in capitals of district in order to contrast and verify the list
elaborated by FITEL employees in order to obtain a final list with prioritized locations
* A finalized list was elaborated with the selected rural communities, which shared similar
characteristics such as level of development, size of population, economic activities, and
accessibility
FITEL used the finalized list in its three first RPT projects, dividing the projects according to
grouped areas in order to take advantage of economies of scale.
3.9. The Technology
Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) technology was used in the RPT projects. This
technology was chosen in all of the projects because of the harsh geographical conditions found
in Peru that prohibited the use of landlines or mobile telephones. VSAT equipment is a
technology that enables the center of operations in Lima to communicate with the rural
community and provide telephone service through an aerial satellite while allowing for high
levels of service availability (Grupo de Telecomunicaciones Rurales, 2008).
The elements of the FITEL VSAT telephone system are the telephone receiver that works
on pre-paid cards, a terrestrial antenna, pre-paid phone cards, solar panels, batteries, and an aerial
satellite that transmits the data from the rural community to Lima and vice versa.
As we will see in the next chapter, the technology used presented some challenges to the RPT
projects due to an incompatibility between the method of payment (pre-paid phone cards) and the
rural communities' economies and culture.
3.10. The Actors or Stakeholders
The FITEL projects had several actors and stakeholders that played an important role
during all of the rural telephone projects.
The Local Administrator or Local Concessionary
The local administrator was key to the proper functioning of the FITEL projects and his
role along with the impact he could have on the projects' outcomes was underestimated by the
project designers as we will see in the next chapter.
The local administrator was the person who would manage the public phone. Since he
was the only person in the community that had been formally trained by the private company on
how to use the phone, by default he was the person that would provide help to locals trying to use
the phone.
The local administrator was generally a small-scale farmer, as were most of the
community members. Most of the people in rural areas had very small parcels, which served to
produce potatoes, tomatoes, corn, and other typical agricultural products that were used mainly
for their own consumption or in exchange for the products of other farmers in the community.
Since the economy of these communities was basically of subsistence, harvest surplus was very
small, if any.
The local administrator would come to an agreement with the private company. This
agreement was not a formal contract, but rather a non-binding agreement of operation that placed
no legal responsibility on the local administrator for the equipment or service provision.
The local administrator's responsibilities were to:
* Provide access to the public phone by placing the phone in a location of his home that
was open from 8:30 am to 8:30 pm
* Maintain a stock of the different pre-paid phone cards: 3, 5, and 10 soles (1 dollar is about
2.8 soles)
* Inform the private company of any problems with the equipment or complaints from the
community
The local administrator's benefits from managing the phone were:
* Earn a commission on the sale of pre-paid phone cards. The phone cards were sold below
the cost to the local administrator: the 3 soles card cost him 2.8 soles, the 5 soles card cost
him 4.7 soles, and the 10 soles card cost him 9.4 soles.
* Earn about 0.5 soles each time he passed on a message from someone who had called to
speak to someone in the community or when he went out to let someone know that they
were going to be receiving a call at a certain hour.
Since the local administrator's main source of income prior to managing the public telephone
was his crops, the prospects of being in charge of a public telephone was very appealing not only
because of the additional source of income that managing the phone entailed but also due to the
social prestige and power that the phone brought upon him. Being in control of the only public
telephone in the community elevated the farmer's status from being a normal community member
to being the manager of the only means for communication in the community and the gatekeeper
to such an advanced piece of equipment.
As we will see in the next chapter, the local administrators' expectations of the public
phone's benefits were greater than the real benefits. This unforeseen phenomenon brought upon
the RPT projects problems that would prove difficult to solve or mitigate.
The Community members
The community members were mostly farmers that produced beans, tomatoes, potatoes,
corn, or lemon on their own small parcels or had a small heard of sheep, cows, pigs, or horses.
Most of them had a subsistence economy, and many of them traded their products for those of
their neighbors.
Rural community members in Peru have strong family ties and place much value on
extended family relations. The rural telephone is a perfect instrument for them to foster their
social networks. Many of the people living in the targeted FITEL communities did not know how
to read or write, and some older people did not speak Spanish but rather Quechua, Aymara, or
other indigenous languages. The public telephone was the first opportunity for many of the
community members to interact with some sort of modern technology. Moreover, there were
community members that had traveled to other communities or main cities due to business or
family matters and had been in contact with public telephones or other more advanced
technologies.
As we will see in the next chapter, the community member's economic conditions,
culture, and level of development affected whether and how they used the phone.
The Local authorities
Contrary to what one would assume, the RPT projects had little local authority
participation. The only moment when local authorities participated in the projects was when
FITEL contrasted and verified its initial list of possible communities with the local authorities of
some capitals of district, but even then it was a small sample compared to the universe of
possible communities.
While the literature on ICT for development recommends that local authorities participate
in projects that incorporate technology as a means to foster economic development, the RPT
projects left the local authorities out of the process. The reasons why this occurred is because the
projects were implemented and operated by the private sector as a business, so the private sector
tried to run the projects as a business, isolating them from any political pressures.
Local authorities did exercise some pressure by suggesting to the private company's
where the public phone would be most appropriate and whom should receive it. These pressures
usually were clientelistic and benefited the mayor's friends or family. Despite these pressures, the
private company usually enjoyed the needed discretion to choose where to install the phone. If
the local authorities did not agree with the private company's decision, they might put pressure
on or hassle the local administrator. What was common in FITEL's rural communities is that the
local authority took credit for the pubic telephone's installation.
The NGO/Non-Profit sector
A very interesting fact of the FITEL RPT projects is that the non-profit sector has been
virtually absent from the discussions, design, and implementation of the projects. There are only
a handful of cases where non-profits have taken advantage of the RPT projects and formulated
their own projects. The two most known cases are that of non-profits: CEPES, a Peruvian non-
profit, and ITDG, a British charity. Both of these organizations formulated their own projects
over the technology and services provided by FITEL and offered an added value service to the
community members. For example, ITDG developed six community-based web pages while
CEPES created a Rural Irrigation System that allowed the water users of a certain province to
access important information such as prices over the Internet.
As will be seen in chapter 4, the absence of the non-profit sector as an advocate for the
rural communities was definitely a factor for the persistence of some of the RPT projects'
problems.
Government Officials
There were different actors and organizations involved in the RPT projects. Among them
the most important actors were the FITEL employees. These employees were a mix of engineers
and economists and were in charge of designing the RPT projects. FITEL officials created the
whole RPT strategy. Another very important group of government officials were the OSIPTEL
employees, who supported FITEL's operations by providing expertise in regulation, supervision
and control, and an overall understanding of the industry.
The MTC officials were in charge of approving or observing the projects presented to the
MTC by FITEL for approval. As we will see in chapter 4, there was a redundancy problem
between FITEL, which led to a political fight that hindered the approval and, therefore, the
implementation of the RPT projects.
Politicians
Politicians played an important role in that their pressures and requests influenced where
the phones would be installed at the beginning of the RPT projects. Moreover, after that initial
phase, FITEL's projects were pretty shielded against politicians' desires of location but not
against political ideas like the addition of an Internet connection in every capital of district, as we
will see in chapter 4.
Telefonica
The Spanish company played an important role in that it provided information and data
on rural telecommunications in Peru. Given that the monopolist company served around 1,500
rural communities and had about an average of 7 years operating in rural communities by the
time the FITEL RPT projects were being designed and implemented, its experience was very
valuable to the private rural operators interested in participating of FITEL projects.
The Private Companies
Two companies participated in the RPT projects of FITEL. One of them was an Israeli
company, Gilat to Home (Gilat), and the other a Peruvian company, Rural Telecom.
Gilat is a manufacturer of communication equipments, such as satellites, antennas, and phones,
and entered the FITEL projects with very little prior experience as a rural operator. The FITEL
RPT projects were a great way for the company from Israeli to secure a large sale of its satellite
public phones, also granting them an advantage in costs when presenting their bidding offer.
Gilat currently operates 5,126 of the 6,056 FITEL rural telephones. Given its large operation, it
has been able to take advantage of economies of scale, but has also been more vulnerable to
servicing such a large network. On the other hand, Rural Telecom operates 930 of the 6,056
FITEL rural telephones. Its advantage is that it has been very efficient at carrying out its
business. Gilat is seen as the "bad guys" and Rural as the "good guys" by the government
organizations because Gilat has had many more errors and problems in its network as well a
lower service availability compared to Rural Telecom.
External Consultants
The Peruvian government through FITEL and OSIPTEL hired external consultants who
provided specialized reports on themes like traffic analysis, universal access best practices,
telephone uses in rural communities, financial analysis, and regulatory analysis.
3.11. The Socioeconomic Benefits
What has complicated a serious and rigorous analysis of the socioeconomic benefits of
the public telephons on the communities is that a base line study was never done for any of the
four RPT projects. Without the information prior to the implementation of the projects, it is
complicated to gauge how much of the development in these communities can be explained by
the FITEL public telephones and how much of the development is accounted for by other factors.
Another problem that challenges the understanding of how things were before compared to the
current state is the little data available on most socioeconomic activities. Many of these
communities trade their products and have a subsistence economy. Prices are not necessarily set
or known, and expenditure functions are not clear either. For all these reasons, the construction of
a counterfactual in order to estimate the public phone's socioeconomic impact is practically
impossible. Additionally, as already mentioned, the communities chosen for the FITEL RPT
projects, although rural and poor according to national statistics, were, in most cases, the
communities that were most likely to succeed.
In this section I present the socioeconomic benefits observed from my trips to 17 FITEL
communities.
The main benefit derived from the public telephone in the rural communities targeted by
FITEL's RPT projects was the social benefit. When interviewing the community members, local
administrator, and local authorities, the same answer was always prevalent: "the phone allows me
to call my family andfriends. "
The second benefit was the economic benefit derived from the public phones. The phone
allowed farmers who had a surplus in their production to call the closest city and ask a friend or
family member what the prices or their specific product were, allowing them to sell the product at
a fair price and not be negatively affected by the buyers who would travel to the rural
communities in order to buy agricultural products. For those who had a small store, the phone
enabled them to ask someone to send them a certain amount of products that needed to be
restocked. This allowed the storeowner to reduce transaction costs by not having to travel to the
nearest market - usually in the nearby main city - but rather just pay the price of having it sent to
their community. For those who had a transportation business, it allowed them to know if there
were passengers that needed to be picked up in a nearby community instead of traveling to the
community and taking the risk that there would be no passengers, thus wasting gas and time.
4. FITEL Findings: Unintended consequences and Unforeseen
Outcomes
During the process of conducting research on FITEL and its RPT projects, I was
constantly discovering findings that were not in the literature, had been unforeseen, or were
unintended consequences of the RPT projects. In this chapter I present those findings hoping to
explain how they led to certain outcomes and contributed positively or negatively to the RPT
projects' success or failure.
4.1. Everything looks bad in hindsight
Depending on who is asked, the FITEL projects were very successful or a complete
failure. An interesting phenomenon is that when asked today on their opinion about the RPT
projects, people who were not involved in the design and implementation of the FITEL projects
tend to dismiss them as failures because they involved an "old" technology like rural public
telephones. This judgment usually comes along with a remark on how FITEL should have
provided Internet access as well given that the future of communications is the Internet. On the
other hand, those who used to work for FITEL and were heavily involved in the formulation of
the projects mention that the FITEL projects, although having limitations, were the best and most
feasible solution conceived under the political, financial, technological, and geographical
constraints experienced by their administration.
Although the limitations of the technology used by FITEL in its RPT projects and the
problems that the projects encountered are valid arguments, what most people giving this opinion
forget is that during the formulation of the FITEL RPT projects (late 1990s), the Internet was still
immature and not widely used in countries like Peru. Also, many of the problems that critics raise
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were unforeseen by FITEL employees, not due to their incapacity as professionals, but rather to
their inexperience with applying certain technologies in contexts that were unfamiliar to them,
such as implementing pre-paid telephones in rural communities, or under extremely volatile
political environments (during the late 90s and early 2000, Peru experienced the biggest
corruption scandal in its history when former president Alberto Fujimori fled the country in an
attempt to escape incarceration). Since similar countries like Ecuador, Colombia, and Bolivia in
the Andean region of South America had never used the technology as employed by FITEL, the
Peruvian organization was not able to learn from these countries' experiences. In the case of
Chile's experience, Peru and Chile's geography and socioeconomic conditions were very
different, not allowing for the adoption of most of Chile's learned lessons, except in the case of
not using coin slot pay phones, which FITEL decided not to use because of the payment
complications and very high maintenance and operating costs experienced by Chile.
In general, the RPT projects have experienced problems of two different natures: (1)
problems related to the design, approval, implementation, and supervision of the projects,
problems generally experienced by FITEL, OSIPTEL, and the MTC; and (2) problems related to
the outcomes of the projects, in other words, the day to day operational problems, generally
found in the rural communities.
4.2. The Design, Implementation, and Supervision Problems
FITEL's RPT projects have been infested with design, implementation, and supervision
problems. The most common problems are:
4.2.1. Designing rural projects from an urban perspective and worldview
Many of the most important problems that the RPT projects faced resulted
from a lack of understanding of rural communities. FITEL professionals the projects
taking into account their urban understanding of reality. Rural communities,
especially those targeted by FITEL, have totally different economies, cultures, and
values. For example, having the community public telephone operate from 8:30 am
to 8:30 pm makes sense when one observes how public telephones are used in a
large and dynamic city like Lima but makes little sense when one understands the
social dynamics of the rural Peruvian world. In Lima, as in many urban cities, the
public telephone is used on the go and to convey brief messages that are pretty
urgent. Any private conversation would not likely be held at a public telephone nor
would long conversations. Public telephones have traditionally aided people that
needed to make a quick, but important and informative, call when they are out in the
street carrying out their normal life activities. Public telephones are placed in
heavily transited locations to aid the person who needs or wants to make a call. By
contrast, public phones in the RPT projects have traditionally experienced most
demand at later hours during the day when community members have returned to
their homes from working on their parcels. Unlike urban areas in Peru where people
tend to travel towards a center location where many different offices reside and
where public telephones are placed due to the expected demand, rural areas in Peru
experience an inverse effect: people tend to travel away from the center of the
community - where the phone is usually placed - and towards their parcels, which
are scattered across the nearby mountains and lands. This movement away from the
public telephone by a large portion of the population, at least those who work on the
land during the day, translated into fewer calls made compared to the late afternoon
when community members return home from work. In many communities lines are
formed at the public telephone between 6 pm and 8:30 pm because, unlike urban
public phone users, rural people use the phones to talk for slightly longer periods
with their family members, who are most likely returning home as well.
4.2.2. Fierce Competition Among Government Agencies
FITEL faced fierce competition from within government, where a battle for control
and recognition took place, delaying the FITEL's RPT projects. While competition among
government agencies can bring benefits like increase in productivity and efficiency in the
agencies' processes and outcomes, competition can also create obstacles and problems that
may hinder the agencies' performance. Given FITEL's prestige among government agencies
and it's highly technical work, the Vice minister of Communications attempted to do the
same type of projects in an effort to obtain recognition. In 2004, The Ministry of
Transportation and Communications (MTC) created its own Office of Communication
Projects (OPC) with functions and objectives virtually identical to those of FITEL. The main
difference was that FITEL had accumulated a great amount of money through the 1% revenue
tax it charged the private telecom companies while the OPC had no available funds (it had to
apply for money from the public treasury as did all the other ministries and public entities).
Additionally, FITEL's projects did not have to comply with the National Public Investment
System's (SNIP) requirements because its funds were not considered as part of the public
treasury, which granted it discretion over the money that had been accumulating in the fund.
Before the OPC was created, the MTC approved the projects without much trouble but after
the creation of the OPC, the MTC would direct the projects sent to them for approval by
FITEL to the OPC, who would make many observations and delay the approval of FITEL's
projects. As a former general manager of FITEL said to me in an interview, the OPC had
orders to not approve any of FITEL's projects. Furthermore, the OPC would copy the
projects that FITEL would present and present them as theirs in order to seek funding from
the public treasury through the SNIP. Unfortunately, no significant project was implemented
by the OPC. This adverse institutional arrangement impeded that many of FITEL's projects
be approved in a timely manner, adversely affecting the rural communities who needed the
help. While FITEL denounced that the MTC, and specifically the OPC, hindered the
implementation of the projects, the MTC and OPC would argue that FITEL needed to comply
with the highest standards because it was using the public money that could be invested in
other ventures that were also needed, such as health, education, infrastructure, etc.
While the battle that took place between FITEL and the MTC adversely affected
the RPT projects and the targeted populations by delaying the projects, there were also
considerable benefits that have gone unseen and no one seems to acknowledge or recognize.
Since the MTC was very strict when evaluating FITEL's projects, FITEL employees were
extremely careful and rigorous when elaborating their projects. Since FITEL knew that they
faced opposition from the MTC, they were forced to create excellent projects in order to
reduce the possibilities that the MTC would observe and return their projects. In the end, this
intergovernmental battle brought a positive outcome and benefits to the targeted
communities.
4.2.3. Exogenous Changes
Another problem was that in 2004, FITEL's projects were no longer considered as
private investments but as public investments, meaning that the SNIP was going to be
evaluating them. Although this probably improved some technical aspects of the projects, it
further delayed them due to the SNIP's rigorousness. FITEL personnel were trained for six
months in the SNIP's methodology (Cost-Benefit Analysis) before being able to design new
projects. Furthermore, in November 2006 FITEL was transferred from OSIPTEL to the MTC
through a law that was passed, putting an end to the impasse that had been generated by the
internal conflicts between FITEL and the MTC. As would be expected, many of the FITEL
professionals left or were removed from their positions. As of today, and due to the
incorporation of its projects into the SNIP, FITEL has taken longer to design its projects and
has found it difficult implement them because of the SNIP's additional controls and
requirements. Additionally, having the projects considered as public investments meant that
the social benefits were an important part of the project. This change of focus was a
disincentive for the private sector who were not interested in the social aspects of the project
an saw the economic profit decreased with the changes.
4.3. The Outcome Problems
As most development projects, FITEL's RPT projects had mixed outcomes. Some of the
communities had no problems (roughly 10%), others found some minor problems that did not
significantly affect the phone's use (roughly 55%), while others experienced all sorts of problems
(roughly 35%) that, in the end, had adverse effects on the telephone's frequency of use and type
of use. Some of the most common problems were the following:
4.3.1. Problems in the relationships between the local administrator and the
community members
Many local administrators expressed that the public phone had become a
burden to them and that the expectation of additional income was just an illusion.4 In
some cases, the local administrator would leave a friend or family member in charge
of the phone and of the phone cards while he would leave momentarily. These
complaints against the local administrator are important because they raise two
problems that were typical in the RPT projects: (1) a problem of privacy, and (2) the
problem of having the public phone in a private place. Since information tends to
travel quickly in small communities, community members did not experience the
needed privacy to talk about certain issues nor could they be sure that the local
administrator would not listen and then inform others what he heard and the
community members were being adversely affected when the local administrator
needed to leave for some reason and had no one to cover for him.
Some communities experienced a very good relationship with the local
administrator while others had a terrible relationship. The nature of the relationship
(good or bad) had a direct impact on the project's outcome in that community. When
the local administrator was respected and considered nice by the community
(evidence of this came from the surveys and interviews held with the local
community members), there seemed to be a greater willingness to use the phone by
the community members as well as a greater chance of improving the provision of
telephone service by the local administrator. These benefits that spurred from the
positive relationship between the local administrator and the community were due to
the fact that the community members had no problem of going into the local
4 Many of the local administrators had to continue providing the phone service because of the arrangement they had
with the private company. If the local administrators did not want to have the phone any longer, they would just stop
caring about providing the service and the private company would notice the decline in traffic and receive the
complaints from the community members and eventually give the phone to another person in the community.
administrators home or paying him for his services (when he received and
transferred a message). When the relationship between the local administrator and
the community was antagonistic (due to the local administrator not treating them
well or not helping them if they had problems, or if the local administrator
eavesdropped on their conversations, or if the local administrator closed the area of
his house where the phone was located and left), the community members wanted
nothing to do with the local administrator and took him as a disincentive to using the
phone. Paying the local administrator for a service or going into his house was just
not an option for the unhappy community members. On the other hand, there have
been many cases of communities where, contrary to what the literature would say
about his monopolistic situation, the local administrator would improve the
telephone service and experience by installing a phone booth to ensure customer
privacy, installing light bulbs, selling snacks and beverages, and installing a
megaphone in order to announce when a community member is being called. These
local administrators found in the provision of telephone service a way to serve their
community and find pride in their work. As Tendler observed when looking at
public service agents in the health sector of Brazil, many individuals providing
public services are proud of serving the public and want to go home at night feeling
like they have done good to others (Tendler, 1997).
One example of a common problem between the local administrator and the
rural communities was the issue of privacy. A complaint that community members
frequently raised about the local administrator was that he eavesdropped on their
conversations. Since the local administrator was a monopolist he could just sit down
in his own room or store or wherever he had placed the phone and listen to the
conversations that took place. Another common complaint was that the local
administrator would leave his house and close the place where the phone was
located. When asked about this accusation, the local administrators would usually
say that the only way for them to live was through the income generated from their
crops.
These problems with the local administrator had tremendous implications for
the RPT project's outcomes in terms of type of use and frequency of use. First, the
problems affect the possible type of use because many people would abstain from
talking about certain issues reducing the potential phone benefits and the amount of
possible traffic. In other words, if a community member feared eavesdropping from
the local administrator he probably will not discuss certain topics to his family or
friends and if there is no other issue to be discussed, he will not place a call. Second,
the community member's animosity towards the local administrator generated by his
spying would prevent the community members to utilize the phone unless under an
emergency. Third, the local administrator's absence and consequent closing down of
the location of the phone reduced the number of hours the public phone was
available to the community members. By observing the project's outcomes and
visiting the communities we can conclude that the local administrator was
underestimated by the decision makers during the design phase of the projects. This
underestimation is common in rural projects that are elaborated in urban settings and
FITEL recognizes, in hindsight, that it incurred in this error.
4.3.2. Problems with the type of technology and how the money was collected
Another important problem was the fact that the public telephones employed
in the RPT projects used pre-paid telephones instead of coin slot telephones. The
reasons why are fairly obvious from the private sector's point of view. Given that
most of the rural communities are isolated and very difficult to access, the private
companies reduce the operating and maintenance costs by selling pre-paid phone
cards to the local administrator in the main cities, who then must sell the cards to the
community members interested in using the public telephone. When buying the pre-
paid phone cards, the local administrator had the problem of transaction costs
incurred in and money that could not be used on other businesses because they were
invested in the form of pre-paid phone cards, which had a slow turnaround. Critics,
as well as most community members and local administrators, would have preferred
coin slot telephones and complained about the pre-paid telephone. From the
community member's point of view, the pre-paid phone cards were a problem
because community members, who were of modest means, preferred to pay for each
call they made instead of paying an upfront amount for a phone card. The cost of
making a local cost was 0.2 soles and 1 sol for calling a cell phone, or about 8 cents
of a US dollar for local calls or 30 cents for calling a cell phone, at current exchange
rates. Many times, the community members did not have the needed amount to buy
the card of minimum value, which cost 3 soles or about 1.2 US dollars at current
exchange rates, because, as is common in many rural communities, the community
member's expenditures were done at a daily basis and with no possibility of buying
for future use. This payment problem was amplified when, due to the higher demand
for the card of lowest value, the cards of lower value were sold out. What is not
known by most FITEL critics is the fact that FITEL decided not to tie contracts for
the RPT projects with coin slot telephones because of the problems that Chile's
investment fund experienced with these types of phones and when collecting the
money. Not only is it highly expensive to travel to each rural community and collect
the money (or highly troublesome to establish an agreement with the local
administrator through which he is responsible for collecting the money and taking it
to the nearest city to deposit in the private company's bank account on a regular
basis), the technology used in coin slot telephones is much more sensitive to dust
and weather conditions, and prone to human manipulation and burglary than pre-
paid telephones because of the additional technology needed to handle the coins,
increasing the cost of the telephone's maintanance.
Also, although the choice of VSAT was appropriate as a way to reduce
costs due to the harsh geographic conditions, it introduced a delay into the
communication that affected the quality of service. Interestingly, community
members did not really complain about this issue.
4.3.3. Where are the advocates? - A collective action problem
Another one of the problems has been the lack of pressure on the private sector
and the government, namely FITEL, from the population, political actors, local
authorities, or non-profit sector. One of the reasons for this lack of advocacy can be
explained by Mancur Olson's (Olson, 1965) collective action problem. Thousands of
isolated communities would like to have access to phone services, and thousands of the
communities that do have the service would prefer it to be different (better quality of
service, lower rates, the possibility of having coin-slot telephones instead of phones
working with pre-paid phone cards, more privacy, etc.). The reason why all these actors
have not been able to influence the government authorities is because of their isolation
and lack of communications mechanisms between each other. What occurs in each of
and across all these communities is a typical example of a collective action problem
where people and groups that would benefit from grouping together and pushing for
reform are not able to communicate and connect. It is also surprising that the non-profit
sector in Peru has been rather silent on the issue of rural telecommunications given that
it is extremely active in its advocacy in other industries such as the mining industry. One
hypothesis for this lack of advocacy from the non-profit sector is that most non-profit
organizations in Peru are not strong on technical issues like telecommunications and
prefer to focus on problems in which they have gained certain experience and
understanding. Another hypothesis is that non-profits focus mainly on the activities that
are actively affecting rural communities in a negative way, such as some mining
activities, but not on activities that are not present but should be due to the passive
negative effects they have on the population due to decreased opportunities for
development.
5. Conclusions
The Peruvian Telecommunications Investment Fund (FITEL) is an example of a public
policy put in place to correct a market failure, one in which the market does not serve certain
communities because doing so would not provide a profit for the private companies, and in some
cases, make them incur in an economic loss. The Peruvian government decided to correct the
market failure through subsidies granted by FITEL.
The FITEL's RPT projects had mixed outcomes. While some projects were very good if
evaluated by certain criteria (for example, the increased number of customers served by the
public telephones or the reduction in the community members' transaction costs related to
communicating with family members), others where really bad (for example, some communities
presented no generated traffic for weeks, making the private company's venture unprofitable and,
therefore, increasing the likelihood that the private sector would leave and not serve the
community as soon as his contract with FITEL ended). Furthermore, by disaggregating all RPT
projects and not considering them as one homogenous whole, we are able to account for the
variance that was present in the outcomes and implementations of the rural phones in individual
communities.
Essential to the good performance of the projects was the participation of the
community's local administrator, whose role was underestimated at the design phase of the
projects by the decision makers in Lima. The decision-makers' urban mindset and the subsequent
project design accounted for many of the problems, such as the complications of installing a
public phone in a private space or not accounting for the problems that came with the private
company's use of pre-paid public telephones. Since the RPT projects were carried out in a top-
down approach, although some participation was included at the beginning, there was little
contextualization and adaptation to the rural realities. An example of this was that the
technological solution - the rural public telephones - was put in place with little regard for
cultural, language, and educational considerations and without any proper training of the targeted
population. Many of the people that were benefited by FITEL did not know how to read and
reading the instructions on the back of the phone card was a huge obstacle to them.
FITEL not only encountered obstacles and problems from outside the government. FITEL
also received pressure by other state agencies and, in the end, was absorbed by another
government institution after spending several years battling it.
Problems that are now identified and criticized in hindsight were unintended and
unforeseen by several actors who had incentives to find the most optimal solution. The design of
the RPT projects, in part due to them being the first set of FITEL projects, were victim of
inexperience and a lack of capacity to foresee these problems but not due to a lack of capacity by
FITEL's employees.
Along the years, FITEL has made many mistakes such as designing their RPT projects
with little or no consideration of rural realities, not establishing in the contract the community's
training as an obligation for the private company, and most importantly underestimating the role
of, to my opinion, the most important actor in the RPT model: the local administrator. Despite its
mistakes, FITEL has learned from them and has incorporated into its recent projects elements
that would eliminate or at least mitigate the problems preset in the RPT projects. This is an
interesting case of institutional learning that was driven by the mistakes that caused FITEL much
criticism from inside the government and a lower level of phone use by the local community
members.
Regardless of FITEL's mistakes and the problems it faced, trying to address and solve
many of the RPT problems would have created new problems or made the RPT projects
unfeasible due to prohibiting costs. An example of this is the problem of using pre-paid phones
vs. using coin slot phones. Choosing coin slot phones would have been more appropriate given
the rural communities' economies and their preferences, but would have made the effort way too
costly, probably halting the projects. Incorporating training programs into the contracts might
have been a disincentive to the private companies since they argued that education was not a part
of their core business and should have been assigned to another agent specialized in rural training
and education.
Additionally, many of the RPT problems spurred positive consequences. For example, the
fierce competition between FITEL and the MTC caused FITEL to perform better and to work
harder in order to have its RPT projects approved. The organizational change experienced by
FITEL also brought advantages. Having to pass its RPT projects through the SNIP, FITEL was
forced to increase the rigorousness of its projects, and to focus on projects that would maximize
the social benefits.
Institutional learning was probably one of the most important outcomes of the FITEL
problems. This institutional learning has enabled current FITEL projects to increase participation,
provide training to the community, establish guidelines for the selection of the local
administrators, and ensure contextualization of both the technology and the way how the public
telephone was managed.
Although the FITEL model has been highly criticized, it has been sold as a success story
and reproduced in many countries such as Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador, Paraguay,
Venezuela, El Salvador, Nicaragua, many African countries, and many other countries in the
world. Most criticism has come from both governmental and non-governmental Peruvian
agencies that denounced that the FITEL's projects did not use the most appropriate technology
and that the community members experienced many problems, which did not allow them to
experience all the benefits that having a telephone service entails.
Even though there might have been a better alternative for providing public telephone
services to rural communities that were being ignored by the private sector, FITEL has been a
key factor in Peru's increased telephone services. As a results of it's RPT projects, the average
distance traveled by a rural community member from the targeted communities has decreased
from 49 Km to 6 Km. Nearly 6,000,000 people in more than 6,000 communities benefited from
the more than US$52,000,000 that FITEL invested by placing a public phone in rural
communities. With the help of projects mentioned in this thesis, families are obtaining health
services, accessing markets, and fostering social relationships. Most important, I found that rural
projects, if designed correctly or if adjusted once problems are identified, can bring great benefits
to those their beneficiaries.
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